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For many, Donald Trump is emblematic of a new wave of global populism.1 An outsider who 
campaigned against the internationalist consensus underpinning American foreign policy, his 
rhetoric suggested major changes to US statecraft, which is assumed to be moving in a 
populist direction.2 What are the implications of Trump’s populism for the agency of the 
United States in international politics? 
 
The literature on US foreign policy has increasingly focused on the concept of grand strategy, 
a trend which has carried over into the Trump presidency.3 As the ‘conceptual framework 
that helps nations determine where they want to go and how they ought to get there’,4 grand 
strategy connects debates over the ‘national interest’ to changing international environments. 
In providing order to specific foreign policy agendas, grand strategy spans military, economic 
and diplomatic spheres precisely because the various forms of power put to use by states (to 
pursue security and other goals) are interlinked. What Brooks and Wohlforth characterise as 
Washington’s ‘basic grand strategy’ of ‘deep engagement’5 entails a vision of the US’s wider 
role vis-à-vis the postwar ‘liberal order’, including its institutions and economic structures. 
As stated by Brands, ‘Trump came to Washington promising a grand-strategic revolution—
the deconstruction of America’s multi-generational project to shape a stable, open world’.6 I 
argue that Trump’s populism is a means of framing the reorientation of US hegemony toward 
a more coercive, illiberal disposition. It isn’t the strategy per se that is ‘populist’, but rather 
its discursive presentation. 
 
To date, there has been little research on populism within International Relations (IR). This 
may be changing, in part because populism is often seen as a transnational phenomenon.7 
This article argues that Trump’s populism is best understood in relation to anxieties around 
American decline, which have enabled the populist message to take hold. Ontologically, this 
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decline has both material and discursive facets. Reflecting this, the article’s investigation is 
based on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), an interdisciplinary approach to language that 
highlights the significance of extra-discursive factors and the co-constitutive dynamic 
between discursive practices and the material ‘base’ of social relations. 
 
The article begins by reviewing the literature on populism. It argues that populism is best 
conceptualised as a framing style that constructs antagonisms around ‘the people’ and their 
adversaries. It links CDA to frame analysis to examine the rhetoric of Trump’s campaign and 
early tenure in office. This rhetoric places ‘forgotten’ Americans in opposition to the elites in 
the establishment, who, through their support of globalism, have caused the US to ‘lose’ to 
other countries. The article then locates populism alongside the tradition of Jacksonian 
nationalism, which constitutes the ‘fuller’ ideological orientation of the Trump 
administration. In examining the debates over American decline, the analysis illustrates the 
ways in which Trump’s discourse exploits declinist anxieties. The article highlights three 
interlocking frames in Trump’s grand strategic and foreign policy rhetoric: (1) the ‘corrupt’ 
elites of the establishment ‘swamp’ (2) the anti-globalist, ‘America first’ agenda, and (3) poor 
deal-making responsible for the US ‘losing’ in international affairs.  
 
Populism as Discourse 
 
 
As noted by Ernesto Laclau, ‘a persistent feature of the literature on populism is its 
reluctance—or difficulty—in giving the concept any precise meaning’.8 Unlike other 
contested concepts, ‘it has become an analytical attribution rather than a term with which 
most political actors would willingly identify’.9 Scholarship on populism tends to track larger 
theoretical and analytical cleavages in political science. Some view it as a model of 
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leadership or governance; others as an ideology; and still others as a discourse. In Laclau’s 
theorizing,10 populism denotes a mode of articulation that constitutes ‘the people’. It is the 
discourse of populism that allows this subject to make demands on an antagonist. In 
acknowledging that populism can have multiple features and manifestations, this article 
adopts a discursive approach that focuses on the instrumental use of language: namely, the 
rhetoric and framing practices of Donald Trump and his administration. 
 
There is a vast literature on populism, which touches on its complex relationship with 
democracy. For Canovan, populism mobilises ‘the people’ against ‘the powerful’ in a direct 
and democratic way.11 This helps to actualise abstract notions of popular sovereignty. 
Likewise, for Laclau, populism has a democratic purpose in that it constructs ‘the people’ as 
an actor capable of mobilisation and agency.12 It can foster a counterhegemonic democracy of 
underdogs, plebs and/or marginalised groups. Some liken it to a ‘spectre’ of democracy—as 
something that shadows and haunts liberal politics; sitting at the periphery of democracy, 
populism can agitate and threaten liberalism, whether through the excesses of bottom-up 
movements or the messianic manias associated with political ‘saviours’.13 Indeed, it is the 
fusion of mass politics and demagogic leaders that leads some to perceive populism as a kind 
of ‘mob rule’.14 The image here is of an irresponsible ‘strongman’ (or showman, in Trump’s 
case) whipping the masses into a frenzy to unsettle the established order.  
 
For some, populism represents a model in which domineering, charismatic leaders use 
patronage to advance the short-term interests of their followers while consolidating their own 
power. The specifics can vary, taking on different characteristics depending on historical and 
cultural contexts. Populism becomes closely aligned with nationalism as the charismatic 
leader appeals to national identity and the purity of the national ‘heartland’. In the US, this 
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brand of folk politics can be traced to the presidency of Andrew Jackson and his vision of 
‘national greatness’ as something to be actively and forcefully promoted rather than passively 
embodied. In foreign policymaking, Jacksonianism implies an aggressive disposition based 
on the veneration of military power and the protection of the cultural, ethnic and racial ties of 
the folk community.15 This sat at the core of Donald Trump’s campaign, which oscillated 
between ‘isolationist’ and militaristic/interventionist appeals, infused with anti-elitist 
messages.16 Although ‘populism’ captures Trump’s discourse, this is intertwined with a 
Jacksonian nationalist ideology at odds with other strands of (left-leaning) populism in the 
American political tradition.  
 
Traditionally, in the US, populism was seen as interventionist and redistributive—a force that 
targeted elites in the business and banking sectors. As elsewhere, populist leaders were often 
defined by their rhetorical appeals to ‘the people’. The etymology of ‘populism’ is revealing; 
stemming from populus, Latin for ‘people’, definitions of the concept converge on this 
constitutive dynamic. This moves the discussion toward a more sophisticated approach, one 
which transcends the narrow focus on charismatic politicians, clientilistic systems and/or 
‘mob rule’. More than a model of politics, then, populism is about a certain set of ideas 
involving ‘the people’ as a coherent grouping. ‘While there is no scholarly agreement on the 
meaning of populism’, writes Panizza, ‘it is possible to identify an analytical core around 
which there is a significant degree of academic consensus’.17  This core is comprised of the 
identification of ‘the people’ as a unitary actor in an antagonistic relationship to a powerful 
‘other’.18 Populism must be against something. At the same time, it contains ‘paradoxes and 
ambiguities’, in Laclau’s terms,19 because the anti-elite message is generally articulated by 




Cas Mudde captures the conflictual notion of populism in his influential article ‘The Populist 
Zeitgeist’, which foregrounds the normative aspects of the Manichean dichotomy between 
‘the pure people’ and their adversaries, normally ‘the corrupt elite’.20 He argues that 
populism is an ideology in which the ‘general will’ of the people must prevail. Mudde is 
careful to posit populism as a ‘thin ideology’, one which can be seamlessly combined with 
other ideologies, either ‘thin’ or ‘full’.21 Others have developed this ideological argument,22 
which is useful in illuminating not only the antagonistic nature of populism but its normative 
features (‘the people’ always represent the virtuous side of the populist divide). Nevertheless, 
labelling populism an ideology—even a thin one—confuses matters. Populist actors don’t 
claim the label. As an epithet, ‘populism’ implies a kind of demagogic agitation in right-wing 
criticism, while, for left-wing critics, it denotes the subornation of socialist struggle to 
common prejudices, assumptions and habits, as displayed in some fascist movements.23 It is 
ideologically ambiguous. For Laclau, populism can be a virtuous and democratic force, but 
this isn’t automatically the case, because, as he explains, the antagonisms and contradictions 
of populism mean that it can be affixed to disparate movements and ideas, including on the 
far-right of the political spectrum.24  
 
Indeed, populism can be leftist, rightist or centrist. It can be top-down or bottom-up, statist or 
neoliberal. In Latin America, for instance, populism is frequently a means of leftist 
mobilisation, fuelled by bottom-up demands of the ‘popular classes’, a category that includes 
industrial workers and peasants alongside the urban poor and even elements of the middle 
class. A charismatic figurehead, such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela or Evo Morales in 
Bolivia, often holds the eclectic, multiclass coalition together. In contrast, in Europe, 
populism is more often (though not always) a phenomenon of the right,25 exemplified by 
politicians like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and France’s Marine Le Pen. Although Trumpism is 
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clearly rightist, and shares similarities with populism’s ‘European’ variant, the larger 
tradition of American populism has its roots on the left.  
 
That populism can be confidently attached to both democracy and authoritarianism and 
applied across the political spectrum points to the limitations of conceptualising it as a model. 
Its thinness limits the analytical application of ‘populism’ as an ideology. Following Laclau, I 
see populism as fundamentally discursive. This is consistent with those who approach it 
stylistically, as something to be performed.26 The populist leader champions the folk values 
of the country’s ‘heartland’, an idealised conception of community that is ‘felt rather than 
reasoned, and something that is shrouded in imprecision’.27 He/she must show that they will 
lead the people valiantly against their corrupted foes. This is achieved through rhetoric, 
framing, narrative, discourse—concepts that are intertwined in social science theorising but 
worth distinguishing for analytical clarity.    
 
Critical Discourse Analysis: Theorising Trump’s Rhetoric 
 
I define populism as an antagonistic framing style built on the normative dichotomy between 
‘the people’ and their adversaries. It is best viewed as a deliberate, instrumental element of a 
wider discourse that is dialectically aligned with the ‘fuller’ ideological interests of the 
populist agent. Trump’s populism is subsumed to his nationalistic and neo-mercantilist 
agenda, one focused on the coercive, ‘hard power’ aspects of US hegemony (or ‘greatness’, 
in Trump’s preferred terms). Trump’s rhetorical strategy, and the public’s receptiveness to his 
style, are impacted by the material context that surrounded his election. Trumpian discourse 
must be analysed in concert with the structural realities confronting the United States in a 
period of relative decline. Of course, the scope, nature and causes of this ‘decline’ are not 
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mere ‘facts’ devoid of political interpretation. The material conditions of the US political 
economy are mediated through the actions and discursive practices of specific agents. Across 
both economic and security issues, Trump’s populism frames American decline as a 
consequence of ‘corrupt’, ‘globalist’ elites. This, in turn, shapes the strategic response of his 
administration, one which downplays traditional policy commitments to liberal 
internationalism.  
 
This article’s theoretical framework is grounded in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). An 
interdisciplinary approach to the relationship between language and power, CDA emphasises 
that power operates both in discourse and behind it.28 Discursive practices are embedded in 
wider social, cultural and political realities. ‘Hegemonic struggle takes place to a significant 
extent in discourse’, writes Norman Fairclough, ‘and discourse analysis needs to be used 
alongside other types of analysis’ to fully grasp socio-political change.29 In contrast to 
poststructuralism, CDA emphasises that discursive practices are ‘constrained by the fact that 
they inevitably take place within a constituted, material reality, with preconstituted “objects” 
and preconstituted social subjects’.30 
 
Trump’s rhetoric plays off of the relative ‘decline’ of US material capabilities, which has 
seen new powers ‘rise’ to the fore in international politics.31 Socio-economic realities 
associated with structural shifts in the global economy helped create conditions for populism 
to take hold. ‘A fully “critical” account of discourse (requires) a theorization and description 
of both the social processes and structures which give rise to the production of a text’, notes 
Ruth Wodak, ‘and of the social structures and processes within which individuals or groups 
as social historical subjects, create meanings’ from those texts.32 I argue that Trump’s ‘texts’, 
from speeches and official documents to his Tweets,33 are best examined in the context of 
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Jacksonianism, an ideological strand of American populism that has long influenced foreign 
policymaking.  
 
Importantly, CDA highlights the connection between discourse and ideology without 
conflating the two. According to Fairclough, CDA differs from other approaches ‘in not just 
describing discursive practices, but also showing how discourse is shaped by relations of 
power and ideologies, and the constructive effects discourse has upon social identities, social 
relations and systems of knowledge and belief, neither of which is normally apparent to 
discourse participants’.34 As noted above, populism is less an ideology than a means of 
framing particular ideological commitments. Populist discourse can naturalise an ideology by 
linking it to the legitimacy of ‘the people’. For Fairclough, this ‘naturalisation’ process is 
hegemonic, reinforcing the asymmetrical power of dominant actors.35 Framed strategically, 
certain political ideas and interpretations, including those associated with elite interests, can 
become ‘common sense’ through their attribution to the ‘folk’ culture.  
 
Based on a realist ontology, CDA attends to the dialectical relationship between the 
discursive and structural/material spheres of social practice. This is crucial to any analysis of 
Trump’s grand strategy, in which populist rhetoric is used to respond to, and frame, concerns 
over US decline. I use the approach to highlight the discursive features of a hegemony that 
has relied on structural, material and institutional forms of power in the postwar liberal order. 
Trump’s rhetoric suggests that unencumbered coercive force can be used to reverse American 
decline and improve the lives of the ‘forgotten’ folk community. This is a stylised, strategic 
ploy to naturalise the ideology of the Trump project, which, while reactionary and illiberal, is 




Trump’s discourse unfolds in a series of frames that construct antagonisms between ‘the 
people’ and the sources of American decline. In Goffman’s seminal study, framing is largely 
about everyday interpretation and common speech patterns.36 Similarly, for Fairclough, 
frames are a form of mental representation. However, Fairclough relates these everyday 
experiences to wider ideological processes.37 In their social movement theory, Snow and 
Bedford also trace the resonance of frames to their ideological function.38 The discussion of 
framing in the analysis of foreign policy tends to focus on individual actors at the highest 
levels of decision-making, including presidents and top advisors.39 There is also considerable 
focus on media framing in relation to foreign policy,40 owing in part to the influence of the 
concept of framing within the disciplines of communications and media studies. It is 
generally accepted that the choice of a particular frame is a deliberate process. According to 
Entman, ‘to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient 
in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’.41 The focus is less on 
everyday experiences and more on the deliberate use of frames to achieve political goals.  
 
In other words, framing is instrumental. This is true whether the frames are diagnostic, 
prognostic or motivational; whether they are intended to identify a problem, proscribe a 
solution or inspire participation in a movement.42 Frames are rhetorical devices that order the 
broader discursive terrain. They can, and do, have multiple audiences, and their utility and 
purchase emerge out of existing discourses. Populism is an ‘argumentative frame’.43 It 
constructs the ‘pure people’, based in the virtuous and metaphorical heartland, against their 
powerful and often distant foes, fuelling notions of a besieged underdog. There is a fluidity in 
populist framing which, despite its imprecision, gains a certain potency in the pugnacious 
style of populist leaders. The versatility of the language (provided by the vagueness of 
11 
 
concepts like ‘the people’) enables the chameleonic, shape-shifting politics that often 
characterise populist-infused projects. In the case of nationalists like Trump, leaders are able 
to ‘dress up’ their ‘real’ agenda with the virtue of the national heartland. To consolidate 
power, populists elide their political opponents with the enemies of ‘the people’. Again, these 
adversarial forces/actors can be vague—elites, foreigners, the establishment. But to 
compensate for this, the framing needs to be consistent, meaning the rhetorical style needs to 
be forceful and unwavering, and Trump’s rhetoric, for instance, is famously repetitive.44 The 
degree to which audiences are receptive to populist framing is impacted by material 
conditions and existing ideological assumptions.  
 
Jacksonian Populism in Historical Context 
 
The Trump phenomenon is about much more than the celebrity-cum-politician himself. 
Clearly, his idiosyncrasies shape his approach to governing. However, Trump’s rhetoric must 
be understood in the context of American populism, a (set of) tradition(s) that can be traced 
from the eponymous period of Andrew Jackson through the racialised appeals of Richard 
Nixon’s ‘southern strategy’ and the consolidation of the ‘new right’ under Ronald Reagan,45 
which married populist appeals with a resurgent and movement-based conservatism. The 
racialised features of American populism challenge more generalised conceptualisations of 
the concept,46 reinforcing the importance of viewing it in relation to Jacksonian ideology, 
which has always placed ethnic and racial parameters on the ‘folk’ community. The 
complexity of this topic cannot be fully addressed here; suffice it to say that racialised 
populism has an extensive history in the United States, which saw iterations of the 
phenomenon prior to Trump. The Islamophobia and xenophobia that fuel Trump’s populism, 
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and which depict both Muslims and Latinos as threatening ‘others’, represent an extension of 
this history.   
 
In Michael Kazin’s monumental study, American populism is shown to be highly elastic, 
more ‘impulse’ than coherent ideology. A ‘flexible mode of persuasion’, he writes, it was, in 
essence, ‘the rhetoric of American discontents’ for many decades, across a number of causes 
and issues; as an approach to politics, then, it has been chock full of ‘ironies and 
contradictions’.47 Although populism is generally associated with domestic politics, it can 
have ramifications for foreign affairs, particularly when it reinforces an aggressive, 
chauvinistic or xenophobic form of nationalism. Because of the United States’ hegemonic 
role, the country’s politics are closely intertwined with its foreign policies. At various points 
in history populist ideas have had major implications for US actions in international relations, 
as was the case with the ‘America first’ movement of the interwar period. Even when not 
actively engaged, the populist impulse is latent in US political culture. Furthermore, post-
Cold War processes of globalisation mean domestic realities are increasingly impacted by the 
international political economy. In this vein, analysts point to the importance of the financial 
crisis and recession of 2008-09 to the recent boom in American populism.48 From the Tea 
Party and Occupy movements to the candidacies of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, the 
populist turn in US politics reflected emerging insecurities and vulnerabilities in the US 
‘heartland’. 
 
As outlined in the popular history of Walter Russell Mead, Jacksonianism is one of four 
traditional schools of American foreign policy. Named for Andrew Jackson, a former general 
who in 1829 became the seventh president after capitalising on an expanded franchise, it 
coexists with, and contrasts with, Jeffersonian, Hamiltonian and Wilsonian schools of 
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thought. ‘For Jacksonians’, according to Mead, ‘the prime goal of the American people is not 
the commercial and industrial policy sought by Hamiltonians, nor the administrative 
excellence in support of moral values that Wilsonians seek, nor Jeffersonian liberty’. Rather, 
‘Jacksonians believe the government should do everything in its power to promote the well-
being—political, moral, economic—of the folk community’.49 Rooted in Protestant beliefs 
and the emotional terrain of the frontier, this ‘instinct’, for Mead, emphasises the heartland 
and the heroism of the American people. Jacksonians have little regard for international law, 
multilateral institutions or ‘soft power’. In an anarchic and violent world, military might is 
paramount. Because warfighting is seen to enhance the honour of the nation and its people, 
Jacksonianism is prone to militarism. 
 
Although it competes with other currents in US political culture, Mead argues that ‘the 
United States cannot wage a major international war without Jacksonian support’.50 
Isolationist impulses in the Jacksonian worldview are tempered by a desire for the nation to 
assert itself and ‘win’ when challenged. If adversaries are framed as enemies, the Jacksonian 
tradition can serve as a reservoir of support for overseas military actions and interventionism. 
‘To engage Jacksonians in support of the Cold War’, Mead notes, ‘it was necessary to 
convince them that Moscow was engaged in a far-reaching and systematic campaign for 
world domination’.51 Anti-Communism was integral to the rightward shift of American 
populism from the 1930s through the 1980s.52 This reached an apex during the early part of 
the Reagan presidency. More recently, the George W. Bush administration used populist 
themes to mobilise support for its Manichean ‘War on Terror’.53 
 
As the first president in US history to enter office without any government or military 
experience, Donald Trump is a sui generis figure in American politics. He has professed a 
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strong affinity for Jackson, and his acolytes encouraged the comparison (namely Steve 
Bannon, former White House counsel, and former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, an 
informal advisor). For Mead, Trump’s election represented a full-on ‘Jacksonian revolt’. He 
writes: ‘For the first time in 70 years, the American people have elected a president who 
disparages the policies, ideas, and institutions at the heart of postwar US foreign policy’.54 
Trump’s outsized personality and unusual profile can blur the ‘true nature’ of his impact on 
the operation of the American state; to an extent, this may be (part of) a deliberate strategy by 
the media-savvy outsider, long fascinated with the power of his own brand.  
 
Kazin traces the evolution of populism through the Nixon and Reagan presidencies and into 
the candidacies of billionaire businessman H. Ross Perot.55 The construct of ‘Middle 
America’ stems from Nixon-era discourse and the backlash against the counter-culture and 
social movements of the 1960s and 70s. Trump’s affinity for Richard Nixon is well-known, 
and he has deliberately echoed Nixon’s Jacksonian discourse to great effect. Not only did 
Trump lift Nixon’s ‘silent majority’ trope, he connected it to the ‘law-and-order’ mantra also 
made famous by Nixon. Perot’s outsider campaigns and eclectic ideology provided a more 
recent blueprint for Trump, who flirted with Perot’s Reform Party ahead of the 2000 
campaign. Whereas Perot used his wealth to gain access to the national political stage, Trump 
used his celebrity. The campaigns of Patrick Buchanan, a conservative commentator and 
speechwriter for Nixon, were another precursor. Although Buchanan was to the right of 
Perot, the two were similar in their opposition to the bipartisan consensus on economic 
globalisation.56 Trump claimed many of the cultural issues exploited by Buchanan, most 
notably immigration. Trump’s rhetorical focus on the construction of threatening others 
(including immigrants, but also refugees, Muslims, criminals and protesters) reinforces his 




Trump seeks to connect issues around immigration, trade and ‘globalism’, which helps 
sharpen his appeal to folk-based (and racialised) notions of ‘the people’ while othering 
‘globalist’ elites. The blend of identity politics and economic protectionism is central to 
interpretations of Trump as a populist. For Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, Trump is a 
‘populist authoritarian’ who rode burgeoning resentment against post-materialist values 
among working-class whites. Declining real income and job security over a 35-year-peiord 
had primed the US electorate for a xenophobic turn. ‘The groundswell of support for 
populists ultimately reflects economic insecurity’, they write, ‘but its immediate cause is a 
backlash against rapid cultural change’.57 Like Perot and Buchanan before him, but unlike the 
majority of Republican Party officials, Trump criticised free trade. Moreover, on certain other 
socio-economic issues (namely entitlements, but also, at times, taxes and health care) Trump 
(occasionally if not consistently) positioned himself to the left of other Republican 
candidates. 
 
Similarly, on the Iraq war, Trump staked out a position at odds with the wider Republican 
Party by claiming (erroneously) that he had opposed the war prior to the US invasion.58 This 
resonated with many rank-and-file conservatives who had grown disillusioned with Bush-era 
foreign policy in the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.59 The move placed Trump in 
opposition to the party’s neoconservative foreign policy establishment symbolised in the 
candidacy of Jeb Bush (reinforcing his ‘outsider’ bona fides), with many Republican 
officials/experts subsequently committing themselves to a ‘never Trump’ position during the 
campaign. Along with his criticisms of ‘nation-building’ and the broader trajectory of US 
foreign policy, the ‘anti-war’ claims helped Trump create what Stephen Walt characterises as 
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‘a crude caricature of realism’. Walt argues that any claims to realist strategy are undone by 
his ‘erratic leadership’ and ‘chaotic, confusing, and inept’ foreign policy.60  
 
Trump’s rhetoric and positions are fluid; he isn’t defined by his ideology as much as his style. 
Early in his presidency, Trump walked back aspects of his campaign agenda (on entitlements, 
for example) while doubling-down on some of his more controversial positions (e.g. the 
proclaimed ‘Muslim ban’). Much of his ‘economic populism’ was quickly abandoned in 
favour of conventional Republican positions.61 This isn’t to say that other US presidents 
haven’t changed positions abruptly, or that the Trump phenomenon is devoid of a concrete 
political program. Populism’s conceptual utility here lies in the fact that it offers some 
purchase on the swings and contradictions of the Trump era; that it captures something 
fundamental in the administration’s peculiar discourse; and that it fosters an understanding of 
his ‘America first’ agenda. 
 
Framing Decline in Trump’s Strategic Shift 
 
Although it is based on measurements of material power, there is a discursive element to 
‘decline’ as a complex, contested political phenomenon, which can be understood in a 
number of ways—from the ‘high politics’ of global leadership to more mundane concerns 
experienced by the US population; from deteriorating hegemonic legitimacy and the 
perceived loss of status to dwindling economic output, deindustrialisation and associated 
social ills. In the context of actually-existing power shifts, Trump’s election was facilitated 
by his rhetorical exploitation of declinist themes. There is considerable concern that Trump’s 
cavalier, Jacksonian approach will damage Washington’s international leadership and erode 




Trump’s major speeches have been unusually bleak. In accepting the Republican nomination, 
for example, he used ‘dark imagery and an almost angry tone’ to portray the US ‘as a 
diminished and even humiliated nation’, offering himself as ‘an all-powerful savior who 
could resurrect the country’s standing’.62 His ‘populist inaugural address’ recited ‘a litany of 
horribles including gangs, drugs, crime, poverty, and unemployment’, with Trump 
proclaiming: ‘This American carnage stops right here and stops right now’.63 Trump’s 
rhetoric consistently interweaves the power of the nation with the declining livelihoods of the 
‘forgotten men and women’ of the heartland,64 while presenting himself as the champion of a 
declining and ‘crippled America’, to quote the title of Trump’s campaign book.65 
 
Declinist anxieties have arisen at multiple points in US history. In the 1980s, Paul Kennedy’s 
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers sparked intense speculation on the topic. The key 
dynamic was ‘imperial overstretch’. He wrote: ‘decision-makers in Washington must face the 
awkward and enduring fact that the sum total of the United States’ global interests and 
obligations is nowadays far larger than the country’s power to defend them all 
simultaneously’.66 The collapse of the Soviet Union all but buried these concerns, which gave 
way to the heady optimism of the unipolar moment, globalisation and the Washington 
Consensus. The post-9/11 period saw a deepening hubris regarding the future of US pre-
eminence. That optimism, however, quickly subsided during the latter stages of the George 
W. Bush years, mainly as a result of the costly and violent occupation of Iraq.67 Trump’s 
claims to have opposed the Iraq war provided a means of criticising the ‘globalist’ 
‘establishment’, which precipitated this decline through the decision to invade Iraq. The 
global financial crisis, which stemmed initially from the US housing sector, further inflamed 




Of course, the ‘decline’ of one state implies others are ‘rising’. In debates over polarity in IR, 
discussion has centred on the ‘rise of the rest’.68 The key metric is economic output; as the 
US share of the global economy narrows, its status as the largest economy is imperilled, with 
China set to overtake the US in the near future. Scholars remain split on the implications of 
global economic trends. In a certain segment of the literature, the idea that the US can sustain 
its global hegemony is, at best, an illusion.69 In contrast, others see the unipolar arrangement, 
and thus American primacy, as enduring, even if the postwar system is becoming more 
unstable.70 For Ikenberry, writing prior to Trump: ‘Ironically, the prospect of a decline in 
American relative power generates incentives for a renewed commitment by the United 
States to an open and rule-based order. In the end, it is these liberal features of the 
international order that will slow down and mute the consequences of a return to 
multipolarity’.71 In Trump, however, Ikenberry sees a ‘plot’ against the traditional precepts of 
US grand strategy.72  
 
Debates over grand strategy tend to converge on the question of how to preserve or extend 
US power in the emerging multipolar order. Trump blends neo-isolationist appeals with 
militarism and ‘hard power’. Multilateral leadership is downplayed in favour of a more 
unilateral posture, one with little outward concern for the institutions of the liberal order. If 
the Obama administration was focused on attending to the growing constraints on US power 
from a Jeffersonian ideological position,73 Trump portends a Jacksonian approach to decline, 
one emphasising coercive force and a more mercantilist foreign economic policy.74 There 
was a clear trend toward militarisation from early in Trump’s presidency, as evidenced by the 
posting of generals to key positions and a pledge to drastically increase the budget of the 
Defense Department.75 The National Defense Strategy, while showing continuity with the 
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previous administration on the importance of alliances and the integration of multiple 
elements of US power, outlined a greater focus on ‘revisionist powers’ such as China and 
Russia and called for the restoration of warfighting readiness and the fielding of a more lethal 
force.76 The 2017 National Security Strategy recast US leadership as putting ‘America first’ 
to ‘reassert America’s advantages on the world stage’.77 The document also foregrounded 
economic issues, with the promotion of prosperity a ‘pillar’ of US strategy.  
 
Personnel changes in Trump’s second year reinforced the more nationalistic and rightist 
tendencies in his White House. Perceived moderates like National Security Advisor H. R. 
McMaster and Gary Cohn, director of the National Economic Council, were replaced by 
more conservative Trump allies, John Bolton and Larry Kudlow, respectively. Stewardship of 
the State Department was handed over to Mike Pompeo, previously Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency and a ‘hawkish’, Tea Party-affiliated Congressman. As Trump settled 
into the presidency, he doubled-down on the themes of his campaign. He withdrew the US 
from the multilateral Iran nuclear agreement (formally known as the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action). He implemented a series of tariffs impacting key trading partners. In the 
lead-up to a meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, he roiled the 2018 G7 Summit 
by suggesting Russia be readmitted to the group. The overall approach, then, featured 
unilateralism, transactionalism and the prioritisation of coercive power, all in the service of a 
narrower understanding of US interests. How would this be presented?  
 
The ‘Corrupt’ Elites of the Establishment ‘Swamp’ 
 
Since the 1980s, Donald Trump has been a billionaire entrepreneur and television personality. 
Although Trump bragged in the presidential debates that he was ‘very rich’, he was not a 
20 
 
member of the elite, in his view—those who were responsible for the ‘losing’ that had 
produced the country’s decline. Indeed, Trump’s attacks on the elite have been a hallmark of 
his populism. Using slang terms like ‘winning’ and ‘losers’ reinforced a low vernacular style. 
Punctuated by spontaneous gestures and crass language, refined in the worlds of reality TV 
and professional wrestling, his low-brow style ‘brings entertainment value and explains his 
political success’, write Hall, Goldstein and Ingram: ‘Laughing with Trump, supporters are 
empowered’.78 
 
Trump’s background in entertainment provided him with the experience and skill-set to stand 
apart from the elites and present himself as an ‘outsider’ in spite of his celebrity and wealth.79 
This was displayed in Trump’s ridiculing of individual politicians and the wider political 
class, including through the use of insulting nicknames. Trump’s off-repeated nickname for 
Hillary Clinton, ‘Crooked Hillary’,80 served to reinforce the framing of elites as corrupt. 
Whereas norm-breaking carries considerable risks for traditional politicians, it helped place 
Trump in an antagonistic relationship to the establishment. This set a precedent for Trump’s 
early tenure in office; he continued to transgress established norms. Through the use of 
Twitter, his framing of global/international issues was both sensationalised and an important 
barometer for the formation of foreign policy. 
 
Trump has activated this anti-elite frame in a variety of ways. Perhaps most prominently, his 
slogan ‘drain the swamp’ gained traction in the lead-up to the election, and ‘swamp’ quickly 
became Trump’s favoured means of depicting the targeted political class. Trump extended 
the metaphor to encompass negative coverage from the news media as well as opposition 
from members of Congress, federal agencies and the bureaucracy. With elements of the US 
state pushing back against aspects of his agenda, persistent references to the swamp helped 
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(re-)establish Trump as an antagonist of the ‘establishment’. As noted in Sclafani’s 
sociolinguistic study, ‘drain the swamp’, like the related ‘make America great again’ slogan, 
served to ‘construct Trump as the big, strong, forceful Washington outsider who will… 
restore order to American life’.81 Trump’s ‘swamp’ implies a quagmire or morass; wastage 
and seepage—problems associated with the ‘globalist’ establishment (whether liberal or 
neoconservative); in Jacksonian fashion, the (heroic) military is exempted from the ‘swamp’ 
metaphor.  
 
Speaking at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in February 2017, Steve 
Bannon stated that Trump’s agenda centred on the ‘deconstruction of the administrative 
state’, which he would pursue in tandem with ‘economic nationalism’ and ‘national security 
and sovereignty’ (as the three principal ‘buckets’ in the administration’s policy agenda).82 In 
this context, the administration’s first budget proposal staked out cuts to the State Department 
in excess of 30 percent of its annual budget. The document ‘reflect(ed) the White House’s 
preference for a narrow definition of US interests not seen since before World War II. Titled 
“America First”, the Trump budget also reflect(ed) a deep skepticism of government 
programs meant to defuse conflicts, fight poverty abroad, or battle transnational challenges 
like climate change’.83 The budget proposal also included reductions in funding for the World 
Bank and other development banks.  
 
In concert with the hollowing out of the State Department, the Trump administration aimed to 
bolster the resources of the US military. The initial budget proposal included $54 billion in 
additional spending for the Department of Defense, an increase that, in itself, was larger than 
the annual budget of the State Department. The proposal also included increases for the 
Department of Homeland Security. According to the administration’s budget director, ‘this is 
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a hard-power budget, and that was done intentionally. The president very clearly wants to 
send a message to our allies and to our potential adversaries that this is a strong-power 
administration’.84 In Jacksonian fashion, Trump’s foreign policy prioritises coercive force 
over other forms of power. The weakening of the State Department’s capacity was justified 
explicitly with reference to the ‘drain the swamp’ frame by the administration and its 
supporters.85  
 
The Anti-Globalist and ‘America First’ Agenda 
 
In Trump’s framing, the elites of the US establishment are committed to ‘globalism’. Trump 
has used this term in a number of his more scripted speeches. In a major foreign policy 
speech in April 2016, for example, he said: ‘We will no longer surrender this country or its 
people to the false song of globalism. I am skeptical of international unions that tie us up and 
bring America down. And under my administration, we will never enter America into any 
agreement that reduces our ability to control our own affairs’.86 ‘Globalism’, the diagnostic 
component of this frame, is constructed as the antithesis of Trump’s ‘America first’ 
nationalism, which accounts for its prognostic side.  
 
‘Globalism’ contains a plethora of (sometimes competing) ideas.87 As an ideational 
counterpart to economic globalisation, the widespread use of the term on the American right 
is a relatively new development, although it has antecedents in the conservatism of Patrick 
Buchanan and the John Birch Society (which was established in the 1950s, ostensibly to 
combat Communist conspiracies). It echoes the paranoia and extremism of the militia and far-
right ‘patriot’ movements of the 1990s, which attacked free trade and multilateral institutions 
like the United Nations as components of a nefarious plot to overthrow American 
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sovereignty, known as the ‘New World Order’.88 Steger refers to this phenomenon as 
‘national populism’.  
 
Buchanan’s populist focus on the ‘treacherous’ activities of the neoliberal 
‘Washington Establishment’ serves as the foundation for his rejection of the market-
globalist claim that nobody is in charge of globalization. He points his finger at 
‘greedy global mandarins who have severed the sacred ties of national allegiance’ to 
be found among the members of the US Council on Foreign Relations and the 
Business Roundtable. Their elitist conspiracy, he insists, has eroded the power of the 
nation-state and replaced it with a neoliberal new world order. As a result, most 
mainstream American politicians are beholden to transnational corporate interests that 
are undermining the sovereignty of the nation by supporting the WTO (World Trade 
Organization) and other international institutions.89 
 
Just prior to his inauguration, Bannon evaluated Trump’s victory: ‘The globalists gutted the 
American working class and created a middle class in Asia. The issue now is about 
Americans looking not to get fucked over’.90 In his 2011 book, Trump argued that ‘Obama 
and his globalist pals’ were responsible for the outsourcing of US jobs to China.91 A number 
of key issues, from deindustrialisation to immigration, can be laid at the feet of the globalists. 
‘The US’, Trump declared upon announcing his presidential run, ‘has become a dumping 
ground for everybody else’s problems’.92 The globalism frame combines with the (anti-)elite 
and winning/losing frames and finds considerable resonance with Trump’s audiences. On the 
appointment of H. R. McMaster as National Security Advisor, for example, a writer for the 
newspaper of the John Birch Society argued his membership in the Council on Foreign 




To counter globalism, Trump advocates an ‘America first’ agenda. One of the dominant 
slogans of the campaign, it was deliberately carried over into the administration.94 Trump 
expounded on the frame in his inaugural address: 
 
We’ve defended other nations’ borders while refusing to defend our own; and spent 
trillions of dollars overseas while America’s infrastructure has fallen into disrepair 
and decay. But that is the past. And now we are looking only to the future. We 
assembled here today are issuing a new decree to be heard in every city, in every 
foreign capital, and in every hall of power. From this day forward, a new vision will 
govern our land. From this moment on, it’s going to be America first.95 
 
The ‘America first’ frame dates to 1940, when pro-fascist populists led by Father Charles 
Coughlin, a Catholic priest and radio personality, created the America First Committee to try 
and prevent the US from entering the war on the side of the Allies.96 The Committee was 
bolstered by the celebrity aviator Charles Lindbergh, who espoused anti-Semitic and 
isolationist views. ‘While Lindbergh’s hostility to a crusading foreign policy was 
fundamentally inspired by the dissenting Jeffersonian tradition’, writes Michael Hunt, ‘it was 
strongly reinforced by a preoccupation with race and revolution drawn, ironically enough, 
from the dominant foreign-policy ideology itself’.97 In other words, ‘America first’ 
isolationism rested on, and reinforced, Jacksonian ideas of national ‘greatness’, supremacy 
and ‘exceptionalism’. In Trump, the ‘America first’ frame reinforces the coercive features of 
Jacksonianism and moves US strategy toward ‘illiberal hegemony’, an approach at odds with 
the charges of ‘isolationism’ occasionally levelled against Trump.98 Whereas American 
exceptionalism has previously been wrapped-up in liberal internationalism (or ‘globalism’, in 
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Trumpian discourse), with the US viewing itself as an ‘indispensable’ actor in the 
maintenance of an open world order, the explicit ‘America first’ framing breaks with this 
traditional postwar understanding.99 
 
Winning, Losing and Dealing 
 
Anxieties over American decline find echoes in Trump’s fixation on winning and losing. As a 
candidate, he framed himself as a ‘winner’ through references to his own personal wealth, 
selected polling numbers and the ‘loser’ qualities of his opponents. In Trump’s rhetoric, the 
zero-sum, winner/loser binary applies not only to his own career (and in particular his 
beginnings in the real estate business), but to virtually all issues and challenges confronting 
the United States, from trade policy to national security strategy. 
 
The term ‘loser’ gained notoriety in the 1990s as a demeaning but playful putdown, and it has 
since become associated with ‘little people’ who haven’t ‘made it’.100 Trump has frequently 
referred to his political rivals as ‘losers’, a term used in 243 of his Tweets through his first six 
months in office.101 (He has also referred to terrorists as ‘losers.’) The popularity of the term 
‘winning’, meanwhile, is more recent, and is often used as an exclamatory means of 
generating excitement and humour.102 Repetition is central to the use of this particular frame. 
As noted by the linguist George Lakoff: ‘Words are neurally linked to the circuits that 
determine their meaning. The more a word is heard, the more the circuit is activated and the 
stronger it gets, and so the easier it is to fire again. Trump repeats. Win, Win, Win. We’re 
gonna win so much you’ll get tired of winning’.103 Under Trump, the US will ‘win again’. No 
longer led by ‘losers’ (i.e. weak negotiators), the country’s decline will be reversed, its status 




The winning/losing frame dovetails with Trump’s longstanding penchant for ‘deal 
making’.104 If his 1987 book Trump: The Art of the Deal is any indication, Trump’s business-
oriented understanding of deal-making focuses on instincts and leverage; it is a skill that is 
inherently ‘in the genes’ of born-and-bred deal-makers, he writes.105 Winners win because 
they make good deals; they make good deals because they are winners. Losers are suckers. 
They are taken advantage of by winners, who use salesmanship and imagination to ‘think 
big’, and who aren’t ‘afraid of winning’.106 A cornerstone of Trump’s campaign, this framing 
carried over into his presidency. Speaking to the CPAC in February 2017, he said: ‘We 
inherited a foreign policy marked by one disaster after another. We don’t win anymore. When 
was the last time we won? Did we win a war?  Do we win anything? Do we win anything? 
We’re going to win. We’re going to win big, folks. We’re going to start winning again, 
believe me. We’re going to win’.107 This preceded a wide-ranging discussion on border 
security, immigration, crime, energy, jobs, terrorism and trade. Trump’s vision in this regard 
is transactional and zero-sum, creating obvious tensions. The negotiated ‘deal’ can only 
produce one clear ‘winner’ and one clear ‘loser’, yet, paradoxically, must be agreed upon by 
both parties to constitute a true ‘deal’.  
 
Trump frequently calls trade agreements ‘deals’. In withdrawing the US from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), an unratified 12-nation trade pact negotiated by the Obama 
administration, the White House released a statement:  
 
It is the policy of my Administration to represent the American people and their 
financial well-being in all negotations (sic), particularly the American worker, and to 
create fair and economically beneficial trade deals that serve their interests. 
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Additionally, in order to ensure these outcomes, it is the intention of my 
Administration to deal directly with individual countries on a one-on-one (or bilateral) 
basis in negotiating future trade deals.108  
 
A turn toward bilateral agreements is a key plank of the administration’s foreign economic 
policy. In Trump’s mercantilist view, they provide the US with more acute leverage to ‘win’. 
Speaking to CPAC, Trump pledged:  
  
We are going to make trade deals, but we’re going to do one-on-one, one-on-one. And 
if they misbehave, we terminate the deal. And then they’ll come back, and we’ll make 
a better deal. None of these big quagmire deals that are a disaster. Just take a look—
by the way, take a look at NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement), one 
of the worst deals ever made by any country having to do with economic 
development. It’s economic undevelopment as far as our country is concerned.109 
 
The dominant framing of TPP and NAFTA is that they were/are ‘bad deals’, not because they 
privilege corporations over labour, but because the US ‘loses’ such agreements. In 
announcing new enforcements of Buy American provisions and new protections for US steel 
producers in April 2017, Trump stated: ‘For decades, America has lost our jobs and our 
factories to unfair foreign trade. And one steel mill after another has been shut down, 
abandoned, and closed, and we’re going to reverse that. Other countries have made a living 
taking advantage of the United States in so many ways, as you know, and I’ve been talking 
about that for a long time’. Trump’s executive orders would ‘stop foreign countries from 
stealing contracts from American companies and, essentially, from American workers’.110 
The administration’s protectionism follows this framing. The Office of the US Trade 
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Representative pledged a ‘fundamental change’ in approach, with more focus on ‘better’ 
bilateral deals, enforcement, rectifying unfair practices, defending national sovereignty and 
using increased leverage to open markets for US goods and services.111  
 
On (inter)national security, much has been made of Trump’s coolness toward the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the linchpin of the West’s postwar security order, 
which he referred to as ‘obsolete’. Traditional NATO allies were framed as free riding on US 
military power. As Trump stated during the first debate with Hillary Clinton:  
 
The 28 countries of NATO, many of them aren’t paying their fair share. We’re 
defending them, and they should at least be paying us what they’re supposed to be 
paying by treaty and contract… I want to help all of our allies, but we are losing 
billions and billions of dollars. We cannot be the policemen of the world. We cannot 
protect countries all over the world where they’re not paying us what we need.112  
 
Trump advocates charging host governments for the American military presence: ‘I’m going 
to renegotiate some of our military costs because we protect South Korea. We protect 
Germany. We protect some of the wealthiest countries in the world, Saudi Arabia’. He added: 
‘We protect everybody and we don’t get reimbursement. We lose on everything, so we’re 
going to negotiate and renegotiate trade deals, military deals, many other deals that’s going to 
get the cost down for running our country very significantly’.113 Trump reactivated the frame 
at numerous points during his first year in office. During an address in Poland, for example, 
widely viewed as one of his more traditional speeches, he noted that his administration ‘has 
demanded that all members of NATO finally meet their full and fair financial obligation’, 
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claiming that, ‘as a result of this insistence, billions of dollars more have begun to pour into 
NATO’.114 
 
The ‘bad deal’ frame justified actions to roll-back policies of the Obama administration. This 
included ending rapprochement with Cuba and withdrawing from the Paris Accord on 
climate change and the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear 
agreement). The constant references to these ‘bad deals’ reinforced the notion that the US 
was ‘losing’. In his speech announcing the US withdrawal from the Paris Accord, Trump 
repeatedly hinted at the possibility of renegotiating a ‘better’ deal.115 Announcing changes to 
US policy toward Cuba, Trump stated: ‘It’s hard to think of a policy that makes less sense 
than the prior administration’s terrible and misguided deal with the Castro regime. Well, you 
have to say, the Iran deal was pretty bad also. Let’s not forget that beauty… They made a 
deal with a government that spreads violence and instability in the region and nothing they 
got—think of it—nothing they got—they fought for everything and we just didn’t fight hard 






Donald Trump’s rise was facilitated by his rhetorical emphasis on declinist themes. His 
appeal stemmed in part from his framing of economic uncertainty in the US heartland, which 
he attributed to ‘globalism’ and the establishment ‘swamp’. A declining America couldn’t 
‘win’ anymore. The people of the (racialised) folk community had been ‘forgotten’ by 
hapless and ‘crooked’ elites. By creating ‘bad deals’ on trade and security, in Trump’s 
framing, the US was ‘losing’ to others. In response, Trump famously pledged to ‘make 
America great again’ by putting ‘America first’. This discourse is interwoven with a 
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Jacksonian ideology that has coloured his White House’s approach to foreign affairs. It fuels 
a reactionary and illiberal project, partly through appeals to the purity of ‘the people’ in 
opposition to their normative other(s)—primarily ‘globalist’ elites.  
 
Understood as a discursive style rather than an ideology or model, populism serves as a 
useful conceptual foundation for examining US grand strategy under the Trump 
administration. It helps relate Trump’s idiosyncrasies to deeper traditions and processes. It 
fosters an acute understanding the administration’s foreign policy and grand strategic 
rhetoric. Trump’s populism frames a nationalistic and mercantilist posture, one that attempts 
to leverage coercive power in the service of a narrower understanding of national interests. 
This is likely to contribute to a more ad hoc and transactional foreign policy over the course 
of Trump’s presidency, with further emphasis on bilateral relations rather than multilateral 
institutions. The administration’s early tenure revealed a combative approach to security 
issues and a more protectionist trade policy. Trump’s framing, which is repetitive, binary and 
antagonistic, hides the complexities underpinning the US’s ‘declining’ hegemonic position. 
The instrumentality of this framing connects this ‘losing’ to troubling socio-economic 
conditions among Trump’s targeted audience. Trump’s populism both shapes and, to an 
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